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( Tr. 79). Manning, the defendant, \Yas the only person 
who measured it. There was no visible evidence 1narking 
the center of the highway. ( Tr. -t3). The baiTO\\T pit 
sloped down from the hard shoulders to a depth of about 
2 feet at its deepest point. An automobile could safely 
·be driven from the paved portion of the highway across 
the hard or compact shoulder about 7 feet in width into 
or across the barrow pit. The distance fro1n 2nd Street, 
where appellant testified the fog became more dens€\ 
thereby reducing visibility to the point of impact, was 
one-half mile or more. (Tr. 47). The location of de-
fendant's car when W eenig first saw it is in dispute. 
Weenig is the only witness who placed it parallel with 
the truck. All of the other evidence, including the 
physical facts, place defendant's car two or three car 
lengths to the rear of the truck (Tr. 69 to 71 inclusive). 
W eenig is the only witness \Vho fixes his speed as 30 
miles per hour and he admitted that he had not looked 
at his speedometer since he crossed 2nd Street, a half 
mile or more south of the scene of the accident, at whirh 
time he says he was travelling 35 n1iles per hour. (Tr. 60). 
Manning fixed W eenig 's speed in excess of 40 n1iles 
per hour ( Tr. 7 4), and Professor Carter, the expert wit-
ness, considering the physical facts, eomputed Manning's 
speed at as high as 54 3/4 miles per hour. (Tr. 119-122). 
He further testified that if visibility were as \Yeenig-
stated, that is, 50 feet, a safe driving speed \vould hav<\ 
been 23 miles per hour. If, as l\fanning testified, 8-+ 
feet, a safe driving speed ~Tould have been 30 1niles per 
hour (Tr. 132). Manning at no ti1ne stated he had turned 
out to pass a south bound vehiclP. What h<' did statP 
was that he had swerved to the lPft far enough to a~<·Pr-
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tain if it ,yere safe to pass. The preponderance of the 
e-;~idence is to the effect that the impact occurred less 
than 3 feet e~1st of the center of the highvvay. ( Tr. 41, 
43, 5~~ 5:1~ 61). The defendant 'vas headed back onto his 
side of the higlnvay and 'vas struck by the Weenig car 
a. glancing blo'v on the left side of the left front fender 
near the door of his car. (Tr. 71). 
There \vas ample roon1 on the paved portion of the 
high,vay east of the point of impact, (at least 8 feet), 
for Weenig to have passed the defendant's car safely, 
and 7 feet of hard shoulder on the same elevation east 
of that. (Tr. 58). Weenig's car was 5 feet 5¥2 inches 
wide. (Tr. 41, 43, 52, 59 and 105). Passing vehicles by 
other vehicles going in the same direction in the locality 
of the accident was a lawful movement and not pro-
hibited. 
Appellant relies on the follo,ving statement of 
points: 
POINT I 
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN A-lAKING AND EN-
TERING FINDING OF FACT No. 5 TO THE EFFE'CT 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK AU-
TOMOBILE WAS OF THE REASONABLE VALUE OF 
$1,020.00 AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT FOR THE 
REA'SOl\r THAT IT WAS STIPULATED BY COUNSEL 
FOR THE DEFENDANT AT TRIAL THAT SAID 
TRUCK'S REASONABLE VALUE WAS $1,370.00 AND 
THAT THE SALVAGE VALUE THEREOF WAS $300.00, 
MAKING A NET LOSS TO TifE PLAINTIFF OF $1,070.00 
AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT WITH DEFEND-
ANT.'' 
POINT II 
''THE TRIAL COURT ERRE.D IN FINDING THAT 
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PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S E~fPLOYEE WAS DRIV-
ING ITS TRUCK AT A SPEED OF BETWEEN 46 AND 
53 MILES PER H·OUR AT THE TIME OF THE ACCI-
DENT, WITH DE·FENDANT ON THE GROUND AND 
FOR THE REASON THAT SAID FINDING IS WHOLLY 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE." 
POINT III 
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE DAMAGES SUSTAINE.D TO PLAINTIFF COR-
PORATION'S TRUCK WERE NOT THE RESULT OF 
ANY CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE 
PART OF THE DEFENDANT FOR THE REASON THAT 
SUCI-I A FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW." 
POINT I\T 
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE SPEED OF PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK 
WAS NEGLIGEN:CE ON THE PART OF ITS DRIVER 
WHICII CONTRIBUTED TO THE DAMAGES SUS-
TAINED BY PLAINTIFF ON THE GROUND AND FOR 
THE REASON THAT SUCH A FINDING IS UNSUP-
. PORTE·D BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO 
LAW." 
POINT V 
"THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE CONCLUSION'S OF LAW, AND THE JUDGEMENT 
OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND EN-
TERING FINDING OF FACT No. 5 TO THE EFFECT 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK AU· 
TOMOBILE WAS OF THE REASONABLE VALUE OF 
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$1,020.00 AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT FOR THE 
REASON THAT IT WAS STIPULATED BY COUNSEL 
FOR THE DEFENDANT AT TRIAL THAT SAID 
TRUCK'S REASONABLE VALUE WAS $1,370.00 AND 
THAT THE SALVAGE VALUE THEREOF WAS $300.00, 
MAKING A NE'T Lo·ss TO THE PLAINTIFF OF $1,070.00 
AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT WITH DEFEND-
ANT.'' 
Appellant says at Page 8 of his brief: 
***"At the trial of this case, counsel for defendant, 
~L Nephi Manning, stipulated in the record ·that 
the reasonable value of the plaintiff corporation's 
truck at the time of the collision with the defendant 
was $1,370.00, and that the sum of $300.00 was re-
ceived by the plaintiff as salvage, making a total 
or net loss of $1,070.00 ( Tr. 2 and 65). This was 
an unequivocal stipulation on the part of defendant's 
counsel, with no evidence contrary thereto in the 
record. We believe this error in figures was an 
oversight on the part of defendant's counsel in his 
preparation of the findings of fact and 'vill be con-
fessed in his responding brief.'' 
There was no unequivocal stipulation that plaintiff's 
net loss was $1,070.00 as stated in appellant's brief; 
there was, however, a stipulation that if plaintiff pre-
sented the witness who estimated the value of plaintiff's 
truck, at the time of the collision, at $1,370.00, and fixed 
the value of the salvage at $300.00, he would testify that 
these amounts were reasonable; that is the only stipula-
tion with respect to values. Apparently, however, in the 
drafting of the findings, by typographical error, the net 
figure was written in finding No. 5 as $1,020.00; since 
there was no contrary evidence, respondent readily ad-
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mits that the net loss, in the finding, should probably 
have been stated as $1,070.00, however, in view of the 
court's further findings, the difference in the an1ount is 
imn1aterial and does not constitute reversible error, tl1us 
the respondant was not harmed. 
POINT II 
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S EMPLOYE,E WAS DRIV-
ING ITS TRUCK AT A SPEED O·F BETWEEN 46 AND 
53 MILES PER HOUR AT THE TIME OF THE ACCI-
DENT, WITH DEFENDANT ON THE GROUND AND 
FOR THE REASON TI-IAT SAID FINDING IS WHOLLY 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE." 
There is ample, competent evidence in the reeord 
from which the trial court could find the speed of plain-
tiff's car was from 46 to 53 or even 543;4 n1iles per hour. 
Defendant not only testified that "\V eenig was coining-
''at a frightening speed'' but added ''in excess of 40 
n1iles per hour" ( Tr. 7 4). Adn1itting that defendant 
might not have been in position to accurately judg-P 
speed, yet his testimony is material in view of the sud-
den impact after first seeing Weenig's lights. To that~ 
however, must be added all of the testilnony of the Wit-
ness Carter, as shown in .the Tr. pg. 119-122 inclusive, 
also Card (Tr. 64), to all of which we respectfully rail 
this Honorable Court's attention. 
Appellant most severely restricted the evidence on 
the number of times Weenig's car rolled. The investiga-
ting officer said "I would say the car rolled over sevPral 
times·" (Tr. 55). Upon further questioning by coun~Pl 
for plaintiff, the following appears: 
Q. "Did you 1neasure the distanrP between tlu~ 
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physical evidence of \Yhere the car first tipped 
fron1 the shoulder to \\"here it came to rest on 
its top~" 
A. '~ Approxi1nately 23 steps, about 70 feet.'' 
Q. '~So that the W eenig car travelled on its wheels 
and rolled a total distance of 40 plus 70 or in 
the neighborhood of 120 feet~'' 
A. "Approximately." 
Card testified it rolled 2¥2 or 3 times (Tr. 64). 
Defendant testified: 
of ''skid or tire marks made by the W eenig car 
plainly visible to the edge of the highway and gouges 
in the shoulders.'' ( Tr. 77 & 80). 
Carter testified that immediately after the impact 
the W eenig car started turning counterclockwise ( Tr. 
114) which "\vould require the wheels of the car to go 
sidewise with the wheels skidding rather than straight 
forward with the wheels rolling. This testimony was 
brought out by 1Ir. Bayle in response to the following 
question: 
Q. ''Does this assume the brakes were applied all 
the time until it turned over~'' 
A. ''According to the testimony this morning of 
Mr. Weenig and according to my deductions and 
reconstructing the accident, the car went in a 
counterclockwise spin, therefore, while in the 
spin would leave rubber pending the skid and 
that could be even more forcible or greater than 
actually locked wheels skidding, so this vehicle 
went through this position and went into a skid 
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in this manner, that is 'vhat put it in right angles 
to the center line of the highway so it was skid-
ding, therefore, you wou~d have a side skid.'' 
"If this was 40 feet or whatever it was meas-
ured, the vehicle actually, since the center of 
gravity was back here or .here or 'vhatever 
would be the center of gravity, the distance of 
three feet, therefore, you 'vould have a side 
skid.'' 
Q. ''It would make no difference how far the 
vehicle was turned to right angles to the momen-
tum in the highway?" 
A. ''I don't think it would make enough difference 
to give it any consideration or if the vehicle is 
going into a skid and movin.g forward, the cen-
ter of gravity moving forward 30 feet, moving 
diagonally in that distance, whatever it is, all 
four wheels are skidding. It may not lay down 
rubber." 
Q. ''Suppose the wheel is on loose gravel~'' 
A. "Yes, on loose gravel or sand, unless it is loose, 
it makes ball bearings; if solid and hard it woulrl 
slow it up more. What is the condition~'' 
Q. "Assuming it is a hard graveled surface.'' 
A. "That kind could slow it down ntore than other-
wise unless a volume of loose gravel. Most of 
our shoulders are pretty well co1npacted. '' 
MR. BAYLE : ''The shoulder of the road up that 
way, the shoulder of the road was not a Inacadan1ized 
type of highway?" 
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.\. ~·\\Tell, as I understand jt, I have driven that 
many tin1es, the pavement itself is solidified oil 
and gravel, that is "\vhy I call the shoulders pret-
ty "\veil stabilized. I don't know whether there 
is any grass on it but there could be. We find 
in our tests on gravel between the skidding per-
forn1anre on gravel, 'Ne find the tires get into 
the hard surfaces and slo'v the vehicle down 
Inore than on the oil. That is the usual experi-
ence I have had 'vith gravel such as the shoul-
ders are." (Tr. 114, 115, 116). 
The defendant admitted the same as follows: 
Q. '' _A._t the time of the impact, after this accident, 
what happened to your vehicle in the way of 
swerVIng or at all changing directions? Can 
you state?'' 
A. ''Yes, I can. 1 t seen1ed to turn sidewise, as Pro-
fessor Carter stated, it just swerved that way." 
(Tr. 126). 
See also the testimony of the Deputy Sheriff Card 
as to skid marks (Tr. 53). 
This evidence is certainly competent and considered 
together 'vith the calculations of the expert Carter to the 
effect that the speed of W eenig's car, based upon the 
physical facts ~ould have been as much as 5434 miles 
l>Pr hour was sufficient upon which the finding could be 
n1ade. The findings of the court were based upon that 
evidence. 
The testimony of H. B. Carter, the expert witness, 
i~ found in the transcript pages 100 to 126. In the in-
terests of tiine and space, that evidence will not be set 
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out hec verba but a summation onlv. The 'vitness is 
' .. 
professor of the Civil Engineering at the University of 
Utah. He was previously professor of highway engi-
neering at the UAC. His qualifications are found at 
pages 107 and 108 in the transcript. 
He testified that the panel truck of the plaintiffs 
was 23 feet in eircun1ference; that if it rolled 70 feet that 
would mean 21j2 rolls (Tr. 116) which would mean a 
speed of 39lf2 miles per hour without accounting for the 
40 foot ·skid. 31j2 rolls would result from a 463J.t, n1ile per 
hour speed (Tr. 117), and that taking into consideration 
the 40 foot skid before tipping over, as the evidence 
shows, and rolling 21j2 times, the speed would have been 
48.8 miles per hour instead of 391j2• If the car had rolled 
11j2 times with the skid, the car would have been travel-
ling 42 miles per hour, but if it rolled 3% times, taking 
into consideration, the skid, it would have been travel-
ling at 543J.t, miles per hour ( Tr. 119). 
Carter's conclusions were based upon the testimony 
of other witnesses, including Weenig plaintiff's agent, 
and the physical facts and is the strongest kind of 
evidence. 
POINT III 
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED TO PLAINTIFF COR-
PORATION'S TRUCK WERE NOT THE RESULT OF 
ANY CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE 
PART OF THE DEFENDANT FOR THE REASON THAT 
SUCH A FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW.'' 
POINT 1\r 
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
10 
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TI-!E SPEED OF PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK 
vV.l\.S NEGLIGENCE ON TI-IE PART OF ITS DRIVER 
\VHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE DAMAGE'S SUS-
TAINED BY PLAINTIFF ON THE GROUND AND FO;R 
TI1E REASON TI-IAT SUCH A FINDING IS UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO 
LAW." 
The court's finding No. 8 that the damage to the 
plaintiff's car did not result fron1 the carelessness and 
negligence of the defendant but resulted from the care-
less, negligent and unlawful manner in 'vhich plaintiff's 
auton1obile "\\ras operated at said time and place ''*and 
that said damages resulted proximately from the care-
less, negligent and unlawful 1nanner in which its said 
auton1ohile "\Vas being driven'' is adequately, fully and 
eo1npletely supported by the evidence in the case. 
The expert witness Carter testified that the reacting 
time, after the driver sensed his peril, was 34 of a second. 
At 42 n1iles per hour, plaintiff's car would travel 46.2 
feet before the brakes \Vould apply. At 48.8 miles per 
hour, the car would travel 53.7 feet, a greater distance 
than plaintiff's witness testjfied to as the distance of 
visibility; at 5434 n1iles per hour, the car would travel 
60.3 feet before the brakes would apply. l-Ie further 
testified that the stopping distance, under the conditions 
testified to, that is, a possible 54% miles per hour, was 
21-t- feet. At 40.45 miles per hour, 131 feet, at 48.8 miles 
per hour 169 feet. ( Tr. 119-122). He further testified 
that a safe driving speed with 50 feet visibility, as testi-
fied to hy plaintiff'~ agent, was 23 miles per hour. If 
the visibility was 84 feet, which is approximately the tes-
tiinony of the defendant, a safe driving speed was 30 
1niles per hour. ( Tr. 122). 
11 
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There is no evidence in the record of a substantial 
nature, considering all the physical facts, that the speed 
of the W eenig car was as little as 30 n1iles per hour. The 
posted speed li1nit in the area where the accident oc-
curred, under ideal conditions, was 40 miles per hour. 
(Tr. 74). 
All of the evidence is to the effect that the defendant 
turned to his left to determine if he could safely pass 
the large truck immediately preceding him in the saine 
direction. Immediately upon seeing the headlights fron1 
plaintiff's car he turned to the right and was traveling 
in a southwesterly direction when struck by plaintiff'~ 
car midway between the front of his car and the door on 
his left side. The evidence puts the left side of defend-
ant's car, where hit, at less than three feet east of the 
center of the highway (Tr. 41, 43, 52, 53) with no physi-
cal evidence that plaintiff's car swerved at all until just 
about the moment of the impact in any effort to avoid 
the collision which resulted undoubtedly, from (a) plain-
tiff's driver failing to keep a proper or any lookout 
for objects upon the highway in front of him, or (b) 
Traveling at such a rapid rate of speed that his reaeting 
time did not allow him to swerve. The latter case, under 
all the facts and the evidence, being more than likely. 
That being so, his speed was the proximate cause of the 
collision. Had he been driving at a lawful and saf<' 
speed, defendant would have had ainple time to get back 
in his own lane of traffic and plaintiff would have had 
ample time to avoid the accident by swerving, and the 
evidence shows he had arnple room, at least 8 feet on 
the macadamized surface of the high,va~r, within '"hieh 
to pass safely even with defendant's car in tJH~ position 
where plaintiff caine upon it with an additional 7 foot 
12 
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shoulder. Plaintiff apparently relies wholly upon Sec-
tion 41-6-53 UCA 1953, \Yith respect to overtaking and 
passing another motor Yehicle proceeding in the same 
direction. He ignores con1pletely the provisions of 41-6-
46 'vith respect to speed regulations which reads in part 
as follows: 
(a) ''No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway 
at a speed greater than is reasonable and pru-
dent under the conditions and having regard 
to the actual and potential hazards then exist-
ing. In every event speed shall be so controlled 
as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any 
person, vehicle or other conveyance on or en-
tering the highway in compliance with legal 
requirements and the duty of all persons to 
use due care.'' * * * 
(c) ''The driver of every vehicle shall consistant 
with the requirements of subdivision (a) of 
this Section, drive at an appropriate reduced 
speed" * * "when special hazard exists, with 
respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by 
reason of weather or highway conditions.'' 
(italics ours). 
The duty to use caution in the speed of his driving 
bore just as heavily upon the plaintiff under the condi-
tions of limited visibility as the duty to use caution in 
passing other vehicles traveling in the same direction 
weighed upon the defendant. Under the state of the 
evidence there was no apparent effort on the part of the 
plaintiff to use caution except his own uncorroborated 
testi1nony which, even if there were no evidence to the 
contrary, proves conclusively that he was not using due 
13 
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caution since he himself aillnitted he 'vas travelling 35 
miles per hour when he last looked at his speedometer, 
a half mile away. 
As the writer recalls it, there is no testimony by 
anyone that he reduced speed, but all of the physical 
facts indicate that he increased his speed, notwithstand-
ing his admission that the fog grew thicker and 1nore 
dense and the visibility decreased. Contrasted 'vith that, 
the preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that 
the defendant carefully and cautiously investigated ·while 
he was 3 or 4 lengths behind the truck to deternrine if, 
under the circumstances, it was safe for hin1 to pass. (Tr. 
70) He did everything a prudent man would have done, 
under the circumstances, to avoid the accident, but be-
cause of the speed of the plaintiff's car, he was unable to 
escape, not because he was where he was, but because of 
the failure of plaintiff's agent to keep a lookout or be-
cause of the speed of the plaintiff's car or both. No rea-
sonable person would say that had plaintiff's rar been 
driven at a safe speed under the circumstances, to-\\~it, 
about 23 miles per hour, that the accident would not 
have been avoided. 
All of the cases cited by appellant are clearly and 
readily distinguishable from the instant case. If, in thr 
instant case, the defendant had sued the plaintiff for 
damages resulting to his car by reason of the accident, 
(which he did not), the court might have found against 
his recovery because of son1e contributory nPgligence, 
however, that is not the case here. Plaintiff sued thr' 
defendant. 
As the writer re1ne1nbers appellant 'H ra~ns~ Inost if 
not all of them turned on the question of ( 1) ('Ontributory 
14 
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negligence, or ( ~) that the jury \Vas the sole judges of 
the evidence and it was their province to deter1nine which 
of the parties \vas guilty of negligence. It 1nust be 
further ren1e1nbered that the instant case was not tried 
before a jury and so the learned trial judge \vas the trier 
both of the facts and the la\v and his judgment upon all 
questions of fact, (and the question of negligence is one 
of fact), SY\"eet vs. Salt Lake City, 43 U. 306 134 P. 1167, 
and if supported by any con1petent evidence, will not be 
disturbed by this court. Stangle YS. Smith, 10 Wash. 
2nd 461 170 P. (2) 207. 
We do not wish to lengthen respondent's brief by 
long quotations fro1n appellant's cases. A brief state-
ment, we assume, will be sufficient since the court will 
undoubtedly peruse all cases cited. 
Bragdon vs. Kellogg, 105 Atl. 433. 6 ALR 669, involved 
two cars approaching each other from opposite directions 
on a road of ample width to allow two cars to pass each 
other without any danger of interference. The case oc-
curred prior to the advent of the automobile and the 
accident happened as the t'vo vehicles involved were ap-
proaching an intersection of two streets running at right 
angles \vith each other, each of them intending to turn. 
The one vehicle was on the wrong side of the road with 
no explanation and claimed he had the right to drive on 
any part of the street. I-Ie sued and the court found that 
he \vas guilty of contributory negligence, and the court 
so found even though the defendant may also have been 
gnilty of negligence. 
In the O'M~lley vs. Egan case (Wyo.) 77 ALR 582, 
the eourt laid do\vn the rule that 
''plaintiff, in action for personal injuries, must 
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show not only that defendant was negligent but also 
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the 
injury". 
The court further said : 
''The question of proximate cause is ordinarily for 
the jury''. 
In that case plaintiff turned abruptly onto the wron'g 
side of the street in front of the defendant and the court 
found that there was no evidence that driving at any 
speed the defendant could have avoided the accident. 
There was no apparent reason for the plaintiff turning 
in front of the defendant and he made no attempt to turn 
back to avoid the accident. 
In Snook vs. Long, 21 ALR 1, the driver of plain-
tiff's car made no effort to turn to the right and thus 
avoid the collision, and the court in that case, said 
"Negligence is the proximate cause of an injury 
which follows such negligent act if it can fairly be 
said that in the absence of such negligence, the in-
jury or damage complained of, would not have or-
curred.'' 
With cited case. The court said further, where tl1rre i~ 
evidence of a legal excuse for the violation of Statute if 
one is violated the question is one .for the jury to deter-
mine. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of 
defendant who had the right of way. The judgn1ent of 
the trial court was reversed, notwithstanding the plain-
tiff was on the wrong side of the road. This, too, is a 
head on collision case. 
Staten vs. 'Vestern I\fa<'aroni ( ~on1pan~., 5:2 TT. 42(i 
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17 -l: I). 821, inYolved a deliYery \Yagon being drawn by 
a hor~e driven by defendant's agent along the wrong 
side of the street, not n1on1entaril~~ or for any apparent 
reason~ and "~ith no sho'vn effort to avoid oncon1ing traf-
fic. His horse becan1e frightened and suddenly lunged 
into the Inotorryrle ridden by plaintiff. This court held 
and properly so, that under the evidence, the jury, as 
trier of the facts, \YP.S clothed with authority to deter-
mine 'vhether plaintiff's agent was guilty of negligence. 
The court further held that, the Statute cited, Section 11-
43-C3 con1piled la,Ys of Utah 1907, did not forbid one 
fron1 traveling upon any part of the road 
"which best suits his pleasure and convenience, but 
one doing so must, at all times, be regardful of those 
'vho are passing or seeking to pass in the opposite 
direction or seasonably turn to the right''. 
as defendant did in the instant case. 
Riehards vs. Palace I_jaundry Company 186 P. 439, 
jnvolved a plaintiff \Yho vvas riding a bicycle so close to 
the center of the highway with no apparent reason for 
being there, that 'vhen one wheel of the vehicle came in 
contact 'vith the street car track groove, he fell and was 
thrown over the center of the highway and into the path 
of an oncoming automobile from the opposite direction. 
He sued to reeover damages. There was no question of 
:--:1)eed on the part of either party. Visibility was perfect 
and the accident resulted fro1n a sudden emergency when 
the defendant was not more than 5 to 6 feet away. The 
case involved the ''last clear chance or discovered peril 
doctrine". This court said in quoting with approval 
fro1n Presser vs. Dougherty 239 P. 312 86 ATL. 854, 
"the mere fact that plaintiff collided with this auto-
17 
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mobile does not raise any presumption of negligence, 
especially where plaintiff was riding on the \Yrong 
side of the street and there was no evidence that the 
automobile was being operated at a dan,r;erous rate 
of speed"*. (Italics ours). 
There was no circumstance in that case requiring 
the defendant to exercise extraordinary care, reasonable 
care was all that was required. This court said: 
''Nevertheless the driver (defendant on his own 
side of the street) (ours), was required to exercise 
reasonable care under all the circumstances, that is 
to keep such a lookout as the conditions surrounding 
him required"*. 
and further said : 
'''or that his (defendant) conduct in operating the 
truck was such that from which negligence could be 
inferred, this case would be different.''* 
Purdie vs. Brunswick, Wash., 146 P. (2) 809; was a 
case under a provision of the Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat 17 A 
Section 6360-75, Substantially the same as our Statute, 
Section 41-6-63 UCA 43 the Washington Statute is per-
haps even more restrictive than our section above quoted. 
The facts of the case are set forth in the men1orandun1 
of the trial court in the center paragraph, first colu1nn, 
Page 811. The weather was clear, the pave1nent \va~ dr~·. 
the general visibility was good. Respondent was driving 
as an ordinary prudent person upon the occasion in 
question. Appellant was driving at an exePssive rate 
of speed under the existing circun1stances. llis con-
tinued invasion of his left hand side of the road was at 
a point where he had no right or occasion then to be. 
18 
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Innnediately before the impact appellant 'vas driving 
in an eratic course across the center line of the highway 
confusing to the respondent. He failed to observe re-
spondent's car although he had an1ple opportunity to do 
BO. Of course, under those rircu1nstances, he could not 
recover and ":re fail to see ho'v appellant can take any 
comfort fron1 the rules of la""' laid down in that case. 
In Turrietto vs. \\Tyche 5-t N.M. 5, 212 P. (2) 1041, 
the court held 
''question as to 'vhether defendant's negligence was 
proxilnate cause of plaintiff's injury was for the 
jury." Syllibus (3) (7). 
In that case plaintiff was on his lawful side of the 
street, there were no obstructions, visibility was good and 
the defendant was driving down the highway with the 
left wheels generally left of the center of the highway 
and the body of the truck which was 8 feet wide protrud-
ing out further. Plaintiff pulled his car to the right but 
was unable to pull off the highway far enough to avoid 
being sideswiped by defendant's car. The New Mexico 
Statute was Section 68 511 N.l\f. Stat. 1941, with respect 
to passing to the right and contained no exceptions. 
There was no claim that defendant could not have turned 
to the right far enough to avoid the accident. No excuse 
was shown for his encroachment on plaintiff's half, yet 
the Supreme Court held that whether his negligence was 
the proximate cause of the accident was for the jury. 
Pg. 1043. 
In Ankenny vs. Talbot (Colo.) 250 P. (2) 1019, 
defendant was driving north on the highway at a hill, 
he started to angle off to the left side in the lane of on-
eorning traffic to reach a mail box on the opposite side 
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tance at \vhich operator of said car is able to see 
objerts upon the highway in front of him.'' 
See also Hanson vs. Clyde 89 U. 31, 56 P. (2) 1366 
104 ALR 943, the latter case particularly involved visi-
biliy as in the instant case, where this court held that it 
has long been the rule in this state that it is negligence, 
as a matter of law, to drive an automobile upon a 
traveled public highway at such rate of speed that said 
automobile cannot be stopped within distance at which 
operator of said car is able to see. In the latter case, 
this court held that when a driver upon a public highway, 
with his light equipment, cannot see more than 50 feet 
ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at such speed as will 
enable him to stop within that distance. As the evidence 
clearly shows, in this cas-e, plaintiff could not possibly 
have stopped his car within 50 feet, the range of his 
visibility as testified to by him, at the speed he was going, 
or even at the speed he admitted he was going. O'Brien 
vs. Allston etal 61 U t. 368, 213 P. 791. 
In Sweet vs. Salt Lake City 43 U. 306 134 P. 1167, 
this court held that whether the speed at which a vehicle 
was going at the time, was the proximate cause of the 
accident, is a question of fact. 
O'Brien vs. Allston case supra contributary negli-
gence and proximate cause are discussed. See also 
Horseley vs. Robinson 112 U. 227, 186 P. (2) 592. 
Nickoleropoelas vs. Ramsey 61 U. 465, 214 P. 304. Fisher 
vs. O'Brien 99 Kan. 621, 162 P. 317. Lawson vs. Fon-
delac 141 Wis. 57, 123 NW 629. 
In the 0 'Brien case supra, plaintiff, the operator of 
the motor vehicle sued the defendant for negligence for 
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placing a barricade across the highway, this court l1eld 
that plaintiff was driving at an unreasonable rate of 
speed (27 miles per hour). Under the circun1stances 
(visibility poor)) and hence was guilty of contributory 
negligence and could not recover. 
POINT V 
"THAT TIIERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE JUDGEMENT 
OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW." 
In view of the foregoing analysis of the evidence 
and the law, we assume there is no need for further conl-
ment under point 5, except to say that there is absolutely 
no evidence in the record that the defendant failed to 
keep or maintain a proper lookout, all of the evidence 
on the contrary is to the effect that he did just that, but 
that the failure was on the part of the plaintiff. 
We respectfully submit, therefore, under the law 
and the facts, in this case, that the findings and judg-
ment of the learned trial court are amply supported hy 
the evidence and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HUGGINS & HUGGINS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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